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conditions and the financial system. Some
commonly observed effects of capital
inflows that have been documented in
recent studies1 include real exchange rate
appreciation, stock market and real estate
boom, reserve accumulation, monetary
expansion as well as effects on production
and consumption. Empirical studies that
have begun to appear on the subject assess
the impact of capital inflows upon output
growth [Gruben and McLeod 1996], dif-
ferential macroeconomic effects of port-
folio and foreign direct investment
[Gunther, Moore and Short 1996], effects
upon monetary conditions, savings and
investment [Kamin and Wood 1998] and
the domestic financial sector [Henry 1999,
Tesar 1999, Folkerts-Landau et al 1995
and many others].
These issues are significant for India,
which has been gradually dismantling
capital controls as part of its broader fi-
nancial liberalisation strategy. Following
I I I I I
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
T
he last decade has witnessed a tre-
mendous increase in international
capital mobility. Cross-country
trends in capital flows reveal that private
capital flows now dominate with official
capital flows reduced to a trickle. Simul-
taneously, a rise in portfolio capital has
tilted the composition of international
capital flows towards short-term invest-
ments, exposing individual countries to
enhanced volatility and sudden withdrawal
risks. These trends have been driven by
globalisation, which has enabled pursuit
of higher returns and portfolio diversifi-
cation, as well as market-oriented reforms
in many countries, which have liberalised
access to financial markets. Concurrent
with these trends has been the rising in-
cidence of financial crises, raising ques-
tions about linkages between the two.
Concern has also been expressed as to
whether the costs of increased vulnerabil-
ity to financial fragility might not out-
weigh the gains from financial integration.
Notwithstanding these doubts, most coun-
tries continue to progress in dismantling
capital controls to integrate their financial
markets with the rest of the world, albeit
more cautiously.
These developments have stimulated a
keen interest in understanding the nature
and economic effects of capital flows as
well as the appropriate policy responses to
safeguard against financial instability that
appears to be associated with international
capital mobility. Capital flows affect a
wide range of economic variables such as
exchange rates, interest rates, foreign
exchange reserves, domestic monetary
changes in exchange rate regime as well
as trade and investment policies’ reform,
there was a spurt in capital flows into the
country between 1992/93 and 1997/98.
The magnitude of these flows is relatively
insignificant in a cross-country perspec-
tive, for example, the peak level for India
is 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1993-94, whereas
the peak levels are above 20 per cent for
Malaysia, 13 per cent for Thailand, 10 per
cent for the Philippines and almost 10 per
cent for Singapore between 1990 and 1993
[Glick 1998: 4-5]. However India is a
liberalising economy and it is important
to document the impact of these flows both
from the point of view of behaviour of
economic variables, the financial system
as well as implications for economic policy.
An earlier study, Kohli (2001) has
appraised the effect of capital inflows upon
macroeconomic aggregates. This paper
focuses exclusively upon the domestic
financial sector, i e, the banking system
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This paper is a preliminary analysis of the impact of capital flows upon the
domestic financial sector. We find that an inflow of foreign capital has a significant impact
on domestic money supply and stock market growth, liquidity and volatility. The
banking sector, however, remains relatively insulated due to policy responses of the
central bank and barriers to direct capital inflows into the banking system.
The paper concludes with a discussion on the costs of these policies in the event of a
heavy inflow of foreign capital into India.
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Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India
(Percentage  to  total  [net]  capital  flows)
Foreign  Investment NRI External Commercial Net  Capital
Deposits Assistance Borrowings Account
FDI Portfolio (Per  Cent  GDP)
1986 4.3 0 16.3 30.3 21.1   1.85
1989 5.9 0 34.4 26.5 25.4 2.39
1990 1.3 0.1 21.4 30.7 31.3 2.27
1991 3.4 0.1 10.6 77.7 40.0 1.46
1992 8.1 6.3 51.3 48.4 -9.2 1.59
1993 6.0 36.8 12.4 19.6 6.3 3.54
1994 14.4 41.8 1.9 16.7 11.3 2.84
1995 46.0 58.9 24.5 21.5 29.2 1.31
1996 24.7 29.0 29.4 9.9 24.7 2.96
1997 35.1 18.0 11.5 9.2 38.9 2.47
1998 29.0 -0.6 11.3 9.9 51.8 2.04
1999 20.7 28.9 14.8 8.6 3.2 2.32
2000 25.7 30.3 25.4 5.8 45.3 1.91
2001 40.8 21.0 28.7 11.8 -11.8 3.63
Source: Author’s  calculations  based  on  figures  from  Report  on  Currency  and  Finance,  1998-99  and  RBI
Bulletin,  July  2001,  Reserve  Bank  of  India,  Mumbai.Economic and Political Weekly February 22, 2003 762
and the capital market. The analysis is a
first pass at the data to examine the re-
sponse of the financial system to capital
inflows, using information made available
recently. Section II provides a brief over-
view of the nature of capital account
liberalisation in India. Section III assesses
the impact of these flows upon the banking
sector and the role of policy response
in insulating the banking system, while
Section IV takes a look at the stock market.
Section V discusses the policy implica-
tions and concludes.
I I I I I I I I I I
Capital  Account  Liberalisation Capital  Account  Liberalisation Capital  Account  Liberalisation Capital  Account  Liberalisation Capital  Account  Liberalisation
in  India in  India in  India in  India in  India
India had a closed capital account before
1991, restricting capital mobility through
administrative controls and outright pro-
hibition. Following the balance of pay-
ments crisis in 1991, and the institution
of market-oriented economic reforms, it
shifted to a flexible exchange rate regime
in 1993 after a brief transition period of
dual exchange rates in 1991-92. Financial
liberalisation and reform of domestic and
external sector was attempted simulta-
neously. The timing and sequencing of
domestic and external financial sector
reforms indicates that access to, and im-
provement in, inflows of foreign capital
was a major objective of initial capital
account liberalisation. The sequencing
pattern of liberalisation followed has been
resident and non-resident corporate sector,
followed by bank/non-bank financial
institutions, and then individual residents,
for whom capital mobility is still severely
restricted. Inflows came first in the se-
quencing pattern, followed by outflows
associated with inflows and last of all,
outflows.
Direct investment flows were the first
to be liberalised, followed by portfolio
equity flows within a year and bond flows
after four years. Investment outflows by
resident companies were next (1992-93),
followed by equity inflows by residents.2
Initial liberalisation measures increased
existing foreign investment limits, removed
technology transfer requirements and sim-
plified procedures. Equity inflows by non-
resident investors were initially restricted
to a 1 per cent ceiling on individual ac-
quisition of shares and debentures of Indian
companies through stock exchanges and
10 per cent of the total paid-up capital of
a company. These were gradually raised
and presently stand at 10 and 40 per cent
respectively. Liberalisation measures re-
lated to sale/transfer of shares, disinvest-
ment through stock exchanges, removal of
price and quantity restrictions on disin-
vestment and the lock in period for issue
of shares followed. Towards the end of the
decade, foreign investors were allowed to
obtain forward cover, buy/sell derivatives
and contracts, and trade in derivatives. By
the end of the millennium, reforms fo-
cused specifically upon deepening the
domestic financial markets and provision
of hedging against different risks.
Liberalisation of direct investment as
well as equity flows as far as the banking
and non-banking financial sector is con-
cerned came relatively late in the liberalis-
ation process. Foreign participation was
initially allowed in new private operations
in banking up to 40 per cent by NRIs and
20 per cent by other foreign investors,
subsequently increasing to 49 per cent in
all private sector banks in 2001. Banks
were allowed to borrow/invest in overseas
markets subject to a 15 per cent ceiling of
their Tier I capital in 1997 and to offer
forward cover to foreign investors.
Portfolio bond inflows were liberalised
relatively late in 1996-97 when foreign
investors were allowed to invest as 100 per
cent debt funds in corporate and govern-
ment bonds. In 1997-98, foreign institu-
tional investors were allowed to invest in
government bonds though such invest-
ments were restricted to 30 per cent of their
overall investments in the country. After
1997, foreign investors were allowed to
buy/sell treasury bills within the overall
debt ceilings. Liberalisation of external
commercial borrowings (ECBs) has been
extremely selective and subject to annual
ceilings decided on the basis of the coun-
try’s external debt and balance of payments
position. While all corporates (instead of
only manufacturing firms) and institutions
were permitted to borrow up to ceiling and
minimum maturity by 1995, the ceilings
and maturities of foreign debt as well as
end-use restrictions have been gradually
relaxed over several years. Foreign cur-
rency (non-resident Indian) deposits, which
traditionally constituted approximately 35
per cent of the net capital account prior
to the 1991 crisis, were restructured during
the liberalisation process to minimise cost
of these funds to the banking sector,
stabilise these inflows and reduce the
external debt liability of the country.3
These changes are reflected in the com-
position of the capital account shown in
Table 1. Following liberalisation there
was a spurt of capital inflows between
1992-95 and 1996-1997 into the country.
Table 1 shows a sharp increase in foreign
investment, direct and portfolio, after 1992.
The substantial contribution of aid towards
the capital account in the 80s dwindles
steadily by the 90s (excluding the IMF
loan in 1991 and 1992) and is replaced by
private flows. Commercial borrowing
abroad drops during the crisis years, re-
suming thereafter. Migrants’ remittances
retained their buoyancy after a short de-
cline in 1993-94; these are attributable to
the conscious efforts by the authorities to
boost foreign exchange reserves when risk
perceptions about foreign capital inflows
have turned negative.
Portfolio investment flows exceed direct
investment (FDI) in the early years of
liberalisation. FDI catches up later, peak-
ing in 1995, falling thereafter and recov-
ering only in 2001. A departure from the
Asian and Pacific Region’s experience is
the excess of portfolio over FDI inflows
in the initial years after liberalisation. In
the former, foreign capital was dominated
by FDI after the opening of markets. This
is partly explained by global trends in the
early 1990s when portfolio capital flows
registered a sharp increase. The process of
liberalisation in India also partly accounts
for this deviation, as most FDI approvals
remained discretionary even though they
were placed under the automatic approval
route.4 Comparatively, a one-time entry-
point registration for portfolio investments
in financial markets made it faster and
simpler. This might have tilted the com-
position of flows in favour of portfolio
investments.
How has this liberalisation affected the
banking sector and the capital market? As
documented above, the sequencing pattern
of deregulation initially concentrated upon
the capital market, with banking sector
following relatively late in the liberalisation
process. While at first sight this may appear
a departure from the liberalisation process
in most emerging market economies, where
portfolio equity flows are liberalised rela-
tively late in the liberalisation process, it
is not surprising in the Indian context.
Unlike most of these economies, at the
start of the economic reforms, India had
a relatively well developed stock market.
It was therefore ready to receive foreign
equity inflows into the country, which
explains the deviation in sequencing from
the established pattern.
The next two sections examine the impact
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Table  2:  Banking  Activity  Indicators,  1990-2000 Table  2:  Banking  Activity  Indicators,  1990-2000 Table  2:  Banking  Activity  Indicators,  1990-2000 Table  2:  Banking  Activity  Indicators,  1990-2000 Table  2:  Banking  Activity  Indicators,  1990-2000
(Per  cent  GDP)
Year Total Bank  Credit Investment Net Net  Foreign Foreign Non-resident Overseas
Assets   to  Commercial in  Govt Capital Currency Currency Indian Foreign
Sector Securities   Account     Assets  of  the   Assets   Deposits Currency
Banking  Sector Borrowing
1990-91 56.3 30.2 8.8 2.3 0.77 0.5
1991-92 51.6 28.8 9.6 1.5 2.23 0.2
1992-93 50.3 29.4 10.1 1.6 2.69 0.8
1993-94 50.7 27.7 11.8 3.5 5.50 0.4
1994-95 50.4 28.9 11.6 2.8 6.52 0.1
1995-96 50.4 29.0 11.1 1.3 4.92 0.3
1996-97 49.1 27.5 11.6 3.0 5.87 0.9
1997-98 52.3 28.5 12.3 2.5 6.73 0.3
1998-99 54.1 28.2 12.7 2.0 -0.75 7.13 0.2 0.08
1999-2000 56.7 30.0 14.2 2.3 -1.20 7.81 0.3 0.09
2000-01 59.4 30.9 15.6 1.9 -1.65 8.46 0.5 0.07
Source:  Handbook  of  Statistics,  2001  and  Report  of  Trend  and  Progress  of  Banking  in  India,  RBI,  various
issues.
the stock market. This impact will be
determined by the channels through which
the inflows are intermediated within the
domestic economy as well as the policy
response of the monetary authorities to
expansion in monetary base due to accre-
tion of foreign currency assets. There are
two channels through which inward capi-
tal can be intermediated – the stock market
or the banking system. The level of inter-
mediation through either channel will
depend on the relative size of the two
sectors, the pattern of liberalisation and the
policy response. For instance, if capital
inflows and outflows through the banks
remain restricted, then the impact on
banking sector will be limited. Similarly,
if policy is targeted towards insulating
intermediation through the banks, then the
expansionary effects on their balance sheets
will be limited.
The structure of intermediation within
the Indian financial system reveals that the
banking sector occupies a central place
with a 52 per cent share in the total finan-
cial assets of the economy. The capital
market, with a steadily rising share in
intermediation (31 per cent) is also an
important segment of the financial system.
Both components are therefore important
as far as intermediation of capital inflows
is concerned.
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Impact  upon  the  Banking Impact  upon  the  Banking Impact  upon  the  Banking Impact  upon  the  Banking Impact  upon  the  Banking
Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector
Considering the predominance of the
banking sector in financial intermediation,
a significant proportion of capital inflows
will be intermediated through these insti-
tutions. In theory, if there is no policy
intervention, a capital inflow will impact
the banks’ balance sheets through an
expansion in foreign liabilities, exposing
the banks to new risks linked to interest
rates, currency, country, maturity as well
as asset-liability mismatches. Secondary
effects of inflows could impact the bank-
ing system through a rise in the growth of
private domestic credit, lending boom and
risky loans. However, policy intervention
could either offset or limit the extent of
intermediation through the banking sys-
tem. One, a net inflow could be offset by
running a matching current account defi-
cit, in which case capital outflow would
balance the inflow, resulting in no perma-
nent effect on the banks’ balance sheets.
Alternately, the central bank could sterilise
the inflows deposited within the banking
system, which would curb the exposure of
banks and limit their risks. Both these
interventions will prevent an expansion of
domestic credit and related effects men-
tioned earlier.
A commonly observed effect of rise in
net capital inflows is a rapid expansion of
the commercial bank sector. This has been
true of Thailand and Indonesia, where bank
assets expanded rapidly from 73 and 45
per cent of GDP in 1988 to 102 per and
74 cent of GDP respectively in 1993
[Folkerts-Landau et al 1995]. Table 2
below gives some indicators of banking
activity before and after capital account
liberalisation in India. Column 2 reveals
that total assets of banks in India do not
display an extraordinary expansion but a
modest 3 per cent increase between 1990
and 2000. Private domestic credit in re-
lation to GDP (column 3) does not show
a rapid expansion either, though some co-
movement with a surge in net capital inflow
can be detected during the boom periods,
1993-95 and 1999-2000. In reverse, in-
vestments of banks in government secu-
rities are observed to be steadily increas-
ing, almost doubling between 1990 and
2001. Standing at 15.6 per cent of GDP
in 2001, they represent an increasing trans-
fer of risk to the public sector, i e, the
central bank, during a period of increasing
deregulation of capital account restrictions.
The share of NRI deposits in relation to
GDP remains constant at 0.5 per cent, the
level obtaining in 1990, mainly because
foreign currency deposits still remain
restricted to non-resident Indians only.
Statistics regarding foreign currency as-
sets and liabilities of the banking system,
available only from 1998-99 onwards show
foreign currency liabilities of the banks
have more than doubled between 1998-99
and 2000-2001. At 1.65 per cent of GDP
in March 2001, these are fairly modest in
comparison to the levels observed in some
east Asian countries during the capital
inflow boom of early 1990s. For instance,
foreign liabilities rose from 7 to 19 per cent
in Malaysia between 1990 and 1993 and
from 3 to 11.2 per cent in Thailand be-
tween 1987 and 1993. Both the cautious
pace of reform and its sequencing have
ensured that the increase in foreign liabili-
ties is kept within limits in India.
Several factors account for this muted
impact upon the commercial banks. For
one, the magnitude of net capital inflows
in India is small in comparison to the Asia-
Pacific region, as already underlined ear-
lier. Two, the sequencing of capital ac-
count liberalisation has been ordered such
that liberalisaton of capital account items
directly concerning the banking sector
followed relatively late in the process, with
many important items still partially or
completely restricted, for e g, foreign
currency deposits.
Last but not the least, is the insulation
offered by the policy response of the
monetary authorities. Much of the net
capital inflow into the country has been
absorbed as foreign currency reserves.
Figures 1 and 2 plot foreign exchange
reserves and the current account deficit
(per cent GDP) for India over 1970-2001.
The current account deficit is seen to be
narrowing after touching 3.2 per cent of
GDP in 1991, the year of crisis and recently
turning into a surplus in 2000-2001. The
steep increase in foreign exchange reserves
(Figure 1) is concomitant with this decline,
indicating absorption of foreign currency
inflows by the central bank. In 1993, the
first year of the capital surge, almost the











































































































as foreign exchange reserves. In 1994,
almost one-third of net capital inflows
were utilised so; from 1996 onwards, the
Reserve Bank has typically absorbed 50
per cent of net capital inflows as interna-
tional reserves [Kohli 2000a,b]. Between
1991 and 2001, the rate of growth of for-
eign exchange reserves in India averaged
25.2 per cent against a negative average
of 7.06 per cent for 1985-90.5
Thus monetary policy response has been
directed at containing the impact of capital
inflows. Table 3 presents a profile of
monetary and fiscal indicators from 1985
and offers a perspective via the transmis-
sion channel of net capital inflows, changes
in net foreign currency assets, the mon-
etary base and broader monetary aggre-
gates. Some stylised facts can be estab-
lished about policy response of the au-
thorities through changes in the move-
ments of monetary aggregates in the tables.
First, net foreign exchange assets of the
central bank account for most of the in-
crease in the monetary base (reserve money)
in the nineties. As a percentage share of
M3, the monetary aggregate targeted by
the central bank, net foreign exchange assets
have grown from an average of 3.7 per cent
in the 1980s to 12.1 per cent in 1990s.
Second, while fiscal policy induced in-
creases in money supply have declined
somewhat in the post-liberalisation pe-
riod, it still remains an important exog-
enous source of monetary expansion. Third,
private sector credit appears to be the only
policy variable that is manipulated by the
central bank via interest rate and reserve
requirement changes to adhere to mon-
etary targets.
During the capital surge episode in 1993-
95, for example, the central bank’s mon-
etary target (M3 growth rate of 15-16 per
cent) was overshot. The monetary base
expanded in nominal as well as real terms
(cols 2 and 4, Table 3). As a result of this
growth and the pass-through between the
exchange rate and domestic prices, the rate
of inflation rose to 10.8 per cent.6 Though
monetary variables are partly influenced
by money demand, prima facie monetary
policy appears to have responded to counter
the impact of capital inflows. For instance,
interest rate movements (cols 5 and 6,
Table 3), which reflect both monetary as
well as fiscal changes, provide evidence
of monetary tightening. Nominal interest
rates rose with inflation, while the real
interest rate rose in 1993-94 and fell in
1994-95. Nominal interest rates appear to
have been raised to prevent the real rate
of interest from declining.
Between 1993 and 1995, reserve re-
quirements (col 8, Table 3) were steadily
raised to limit the impact of money supply
via the banking system. A sharp contrac-
tion in nominal and real base money growth
(cols 1-4) observed in 1995-96 and 1996-
97 appears to have brought about the fall
Source:  Handbook  of  Statistics,  2000,  Reserve  Bank  of  India.
Figure  1:  Foreign  Exchange  Reserves Figure  1:  Foreign  Exchange  Reserves Figure  1:  Foreign  Exchange  Reserves Figure  1:  Foreign  Exchange  Reserves Figure  1:  Foreign  Exchange  Reserves
(Excluding  SDRs  and  Gold)
Figure  2:  Current  Account  Balance Figure  2:  Current  Account  Balance Figure  2:  Current  Account  Balance Figure  2:  Current  Account  Balance Figure  2:  Current  Account  Balance
Table  3:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  3:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  3:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  3:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  3:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates
Nominal  Money Real  M3 Nominal  Monetary Real  Monetary Nominal  Interest Real  Interest Cash  Reserve Consolidated
Growth  (M3) Growth Base  Growth Base  Growth Rates  (Per  Cent  pa)  Ratesa  (Per  Cent  pa)   Ratio   Govt  Deficit
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
1985-88 17.1 8.6 18.2 10.0 - - 9,  9.5,  10,  10.5,  11 -
1989-91b 17.9 5.6 13.2 4.5 - - 15.0 -
1992-93 14.8 4.3 11.3 1.2 17 6.2 15.0 7.2
1993-94 18.4 9.3 25.2 15.5 14 7.8 14.5,  14, 8.0
1994-95 22.3 10.4 22.1 10.1 15 5.1 14.5,  14.75,15 6.8
1995-96 13.5 5.5 14.9 6.7 16.5 6.9 14.5,  14 6.5
1996-97 16.1 9.2 2.8 -3.3 14.8 6.0 13.5,  13,  12,  11.5,
11,  10.5,  10 6.3
1997-98 18.0 12.6 13.2 8.0 14 6.8 9.75,9.50,
10.0,10.50,  10.25 7.2
1998-99 19.4 11.7 14.6 7.2 12.5 3.5 10.0,11.0,  10.5 8.9
1999-2000 14.6 11.3 8.2 5.1 12.2 7.8 10.0,9.50,9.0,8.5 9.8
2000-01 16.7 9.0 8.1 0.9 11.5 6.1 9.0,8.5,8.0,8.25,8 8.6
2001-02 14.0 8.8 11.4 6.3 11.5 7.8 7.50,5.75,  5.50 -
Notes: a  =  nominal  interest  rates  minus  CPI  inflation  rates; b  =  averages.
Sources: Cols  2-4,  Handbook  of  Statistics  on  the  Indian  Economy,  RBI,  1999;  Col  5,  Indian  Public  Finance  Statistics,  MoF,  DEA,  Economics  Division,  GOIEconomic and Political Weekly February 22, 2003 765
in the rate of broad money growth. Finally,
government credit, which had declined
between 1991 and 1993, and has tradition-
ally been a major source of monetary ex-
pansion, also contributed to the monetary
base as the fiscal deficit rose sharply in
1993-94. Much of this inflow would
potentially represent an increase in domes-
tic credit, were it not to be sterilised. While
it is difficult to collect evidence on the
magnitude of sterilisation in India during
the capital inflow surge, various sources
suggest that the magnitude is quite high.
Kletzer and Kohli (2001) estimate that for
the period August 1995-December 2000,
correlation between monthly increases in
commercial bank credit to government and
reserve inflow for the previous month is
0.48, while correlation between contem-
poraneous changes is –0.29. This indicates
sterilisation of reserve inflows by the
Reserve Bank through increase in public
debt held by the financial sector. As shown
in Table 2 investments by banks in gov-
ernment securities have risen steadily,
confirming this trend.
I V I V I V I V I V
Impact  of  Portfolio  Capital Impact  of  Portfolio  Capital Impact  of  Portfolio  Capital Impact  of  Portfolio  Capital Impact  of  Portfolio  Capital
Flows  on    Capital  Market Flows  on    Capital  Market Flows  on    Capital  Market Flows  on    Capital  Market Flows  on    Capital  Market
To recall, equity inflows were liberalised
at an early stage of reform. When capital
started to flow into India, portfolio flows
played an important role, exceeding FDI
inflows for several years (Table 1). As
share of net capital account, portfolio flows
contributed as much as 58.9 per cent in
1995 in a span of four years. As a share
of GDP, net investments of foreign inves-
tors in the equity market hovered in the
range of 0.5-0.7 per cent during the 1993-
96 boom period, slackening thereafter.
What has been the impact of portfolio
equity flows upon the capital market in
India following liebralisation?
In theory, capital market integration will
result in a lower cost of funds due to
diversification and an increase in the supply
of capital. Other benefits of liberalisation
of trade in financial assets include expan-
sion in the size of the market as the number
of potential investors increase, improved
liquidity and market depth and increased
efficiency in allocation of investments. As
the link between local and foreign markets
strengthens, the progressive integration of
financial markets can potentially increase
the risk of volatility spillovers. Even if spil-
lover effects are excluded, market volatil-
ity can increase as the frequency of inflows
and outflows out of the country increases.
A rise in volatility can have a potentially
destabilising effect especially if financial
markets are thin, which is very often the
case in developing countries. This can also
lead to large variations in market liquidity,
which can lead to higher volatility. Sub-
sequent real effects of capital market
liberalisation documented in the literature
relate to lending and investment booms.
Are any of the above effects visible in
the case of Indian financial markets? As
documented earlier, the opening of finan-
cial markets to foreign investors attracted
significant amounts of private portfolio
capital, which exceeded FDI in the early
years. Figures 3 and 4 track movements
in equity prices and net equity inflows. The
stock market index shows a sharp increase
over the 1990 levels, and the peaks in price-
earnings ratio display a co-movement with
the high inflow period of 1993-95 and
1999-2000. This suggests that entry of
foreign investors possibly led to sharp
increases in equity prices through a rise
in demand for domestic equities.
This is similar to the liberalisation ex-
perience of other emerging markets. For
instance, the price-earnings ratio for
Mexico rose five times between 1988 and
1993 and doubled in Hong Kong and
Thailand between 1990 and 1993 [Folkerts-
Landau et al 1995] following liberalisation
of equity flows.
Table 4 shows indicators of stock
market growth, liquidity, turnover and
prices in the stock market from 1990.
Market capitalisation measures the size of
the capital market in relation to GDP
whereas the volume of domestic equities
traded on the domestic exchange divided
by GDP is a measure of market liquidity
[Levine and  Zervos 1998].
Some apparent associations revealed by
the time series are noteworthy. One, the
growth of the stock market as measured
by the market capitalisation to GDP ratio
reveals a positive correspondence with net
equity flows, indicating an expansion in
the size of the equity market during periods
of high inflows as in 1993-95 and 1999-
2000. The price-earning ratio also displays
a similar co-movement in these two pe-
riods indicating that a surge in foreign
capital inflow leads to a rise in equity
prices. Illustratively, the price earning ratio
jumps to 22.7 in 1999-2000 from a low
of 14.7 in 1998-99, which is also a period
when there is a net capital outflow from
the country. Sharp swings in price move-
ments can also cause large variations in
market liquidity, though the volume of
Source:  Handbook  of  Statistics,  2000,  RBI.
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equities traded on the exchange in relation
to GDP does not move with these price
swings. Market liquidity in fact increases
steadily over the 1992-2001 time span
indicating no adverse effects of booms and
reversals in capital inflows.
How has liberalisation affected market
prices, volatility and spillovers? Table 5
shows the unconditional correlations be-
tween monthly stock prices and returns
over the 1992-2001 time horizon to pro-
vide some indication of how the correla-
tion structure has changed over time. These
movements indicate that opening of the
capital account has made the stock markets
more vulnerable to the vagaries of cross-
border movements of capital. The table
also shows that correlation between mar-
kets (Indian and US) has risen over time
and tends to be higher during periods of
higher volatility. Increased correlation
across markets is consistent with, though
not definitive, evidence of greater integra-
tion of financial markets.
Absolute volatility, as measured by the
standard deviation of total returns on the
monthly BSE index, rises during periods of
high inflows, viz, 1993-94 and 1999-2000,
indicating an association with excessive
price fluctuations. Volatility of stock prices
also increases relative to that of the US when
portfolio flows are excessively volatile,
which is consistent with the view that
volatility of portfolio flows into a country
magnifies the sensitivity of stock prices to
fluctuations in stock prices of larger equity
markets. This reflects that the vulnerability
of the local stock market to surges and
reversals has increased after liberalisation.
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As the Indian economy gets increasingly
integrated with the rest of the world, a
reasonable expectation would be that
foreign capital inflows would increase,
perhaps even to match levels reached by
other emerging markets. In such a sce-
nario, it is of critical importance to monitor
the composition of inflows. It is well known
that the composition of flows makes a
significant difference, both in terms of
impact7  and smooth management. Portfo-
lio flows are more volatile than direct
investment flows and because of their short-
term, uneven nature, more difficult to inter-
mediate.8  Thus they have a greater impact
upon stock markets and domestic money
supply and can lead to consumption, stock
market and real estate booms via sudden
expansions in liquidity in financial mar-
kets. FDI, on the other hand, is long-term
in nature. Being embedded in plant and
equipment investment, it is less suscep-
tible to sudden withdrawals and leads to
productive uses of capital and economic
growth. Short-term flows therefore, need
to be matched by foreign capital inflows
of a longer duration. It is therefore impor-
tant that FDI flows are encouraged to impart
stability to capital inflows. Therefore, this
is a critical area for economic policy to
concentrate upon.
Correlation between domestic and for-
eign financial markets highlights India’s
vulnerability to external financial shocks.
Preliminary evidence for India on the
relationship between portfolio flows and
some stock market indicators suggests that
market prices are not unaffected by capital
inflows. This exposes the potential vulner-
ability of the economy to sudden with-
drawals of foreign investors from the finan-
cial market, which will affect liquidity and
market volatility. India’s financial markets,
which are still relatively thin and under-
developed, could pose a severe constraint
on intermediating heavy volumes of
volatile, short-term capital, necessitating
excessive intermediation through the
domestic banking sector.
So far, the difference between net capital
inflows and the current account deficit has
been positive in India, as a consequence
of which the impact upon the banking
system has been small. Banks however,
account for 52 per cent of the total finan-
cial assets of the Indian economy. Heavy
inflows in many countries have been as-
sociated with sudden expansion in banks’
liabilities, domestic monetary expansion,
unscrupulous loans and real estate and/or
consumption booms. Moral hazard risks
thus increase the likelihood of financial
instability, as transpired during the Asian
crisis. In such a scenario, a sound banking
system is an essential prerequisite.
The state of the Indian banking system,
particularly the public sector banks, is
fragile. Many of them are under-capital-
ised, with large levels of non-performing
loans on their balance sheets. This reveals
the fragile nature of the banking sector and
is reflected, for example, in the recent
failures of some urban cooperative banks
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Year Net  FII  Investment Growth  of  the Liquidity  in  the Price/Earnings No  of  Listed
in  the  Indian Stock  Market2 Stock  Market3 Ratio  Companies
Capital  Market1
1990-91 - 16.0 6.3 19.7 2245
1991-92 - 49.5 11.0 44.3 2514
1992-93 - 25.1 6.1 29.3 2861
1993-94 0.6 42.8 9.8 46.8 3585
1994-95 0.5 43.0 6.7 30.4 4702
1995-96 0.6 44.3 4.2 17.3 5603
1996-97 0.5 33.9 9.1 14.6 5382
1997-98 0.4 36.8 13.7 15.2 5853
1998-99 -0.04 31.0 17.7 14.6 5848
1999-2000 0.5 46.7 35.0 22.7 5889
2000-01 0.4 26.2 45.9 19.7 5955
Notes: (1)  Net  equity  investments  (per  cent  GDP);  (2)  Market  capitalisation  (per  cent  GDP);  (3)  Turnover
(per  cent  GDP).
Source:  Handbook  of  Statistics,  2001,  RBI  and  the  Stock  Exchange,  Mumbai.
Table  5:  Volatility,  Spillover  and  Effects  on  Prices Table  5:  Volatility,  Spillover  and  Effects  on  Prices Table  5:  Volatility,  Spillover  and  Effects  on  Prices Table  5:  Volatility,  Spillover  and  Effects  on  Prices Table  5:  Volatility,  Spillover  and  Effects  on  Prices
Year Equity  Flows  and BSE  Sensex  and Absolute  Volatility Relative
Price/Earnings Lag  of  Dow  Jones of  the  Returns   Volatility
Ratio  (Correlation) Industrial  Average on the  BSE  Sensex
(Correlation)
1992-93 - -0.43 10.6 1.8
1993-94 0.77 0.95 9.6 3.1
1994-95 0.72 -0.36 5.4 1.8
1995-96 -0.44 -0.19 7.2 2.9
1996-97 0.82 -0.19 7.7 2.1
1997-98 0.69 0.15 8.9 1.9
1998-99 0.05 0.33 7.8 1.2
1999-2000 0.08 0.49 8.6 1.6
2000-01 -0.38 0.17 8.0 1.8
2001-02@ 0.67 0.53 6.8 1.2
Note: @  Period  is  April  2001  to  December  2001.
Sources:  Handbook  of  Statistics,  2001,  RBI;  Dow  Jones  website  www.dowjones.com  and  author’s
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and threats to systemic stability from the
involvement of some public banks,
financial institutions and India’s largest
mutual fund in financial scams. Though
India’s financial reforms have consistently
emphasised strengthening of prudential
regulation and supervisory standards, sec-
tor as well as borrower-specific exposure
limits exist and liquidity requirements are
in place, the capacity of these institutions
to assess, price and manage risk is doubt-
ful. Moreover, regulatory reforms need to
be supplemented with an appropriate in-
centive environment, which does not at
present exist. These capacities can be
created through structural changes and
institutional reform of these institutions,
progress on which is still to gain momen-
tum. For instance, privatisation and opera-
tional autonomy to public banks are two
spheres of financial sector reform that
would address these features but where
progress has been very limited.
Finally, in managing capital inflows so
far, sterilisation has been regularly used
to limit the impact upon domestic money
supply. Familiar arguments against
sterilisation relate to effects upon interest
rates. Since it involves an exchange of
foreign currency assets for domestic cur-
rency assets, the interest rate on the latter
has to be kept high to limit central bank
losses arising out of interest differentials.
This however, would serve to attract fur-
ther capital inflows, which could be po-
tentially detabilising in some situations. A
more pertinent argument against
sterilisation in the Indian context is its
fiscal implication. It leads to an increase
in public debt, and these costs, termed as
quasi-fiscal costs in the literature, due to
a favourable interest differential for do-
mestic bonds, can be substantial. Economic
policy therefore needs to be reappraised in
managing capital inflows so as to minimise
the associated costs. A combination of
policy responses like limited sterilisation,
exchange rate flexibility and short-term
use of selective capital controls to specifi-
cally address the causes of capital inflow
surge, would be most appropriate strategy
in managing capital movements.
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Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
[The views expressed are the author’s own and
not of the institution to which she belongs. Part
of this paper was completed while the author was
Visiting Scholar at the IMF. I am grateful to
Pranab Sen, T N Srinivasan, Kenneth Kletzer,
Manmohan Kumar, Peter Clark, Paul Cashin,
Christopher Towe and other participants of a
seminar at the Fund’s Research Department for
useful comments.]
1 See Calvo, Leiderm and Reinhart (1993), Corbo
and Hernandez (1994), Khan and Reinhart
(1995) and Koenig (1996), amongst others.
2 Reputed corporates were allowed to access
international markets abroad through issue of
GDRs. These were initially restricted to reputed
corporates and subject to monetary limits,
number of issues and end use restrictions
covering import requirements, retiring debt,
etc. Many of these were relaxed in 1995.
3 Exchange rate guarantees by resident banks to
non-resident Indians were phased out by 1994,
short-term deposits were discontinued and/or
reoriented towards longer maturity, deposits
where resident banks bore the exchange risk
were exempted from reserve and priority sector
lending requirements as an incentive to attract and
advance these funds at free market rates, interest
rates on these deposits were gradually aligned
with international rates and their composition
tilted towards rupee denominated accounts.
4 Some projects required mandatory clearances
from the Foreign Investment Promotion Board
(a government body) for some projects.
5 Conscious efforts made by the authorities to
boost foreign exchange reserves through
mobilisation of funds from non-resident Indians,
viz, the Resurgent India Bonds (1998) and the
India Millennium Deposit Bonds (2000) are
also to be noted at this point. These were targeted
exclusively at NRIs and overseas corporate
bodies predominantly owned by NRIs.
6 We acknowledge that real money stock is an
ex post variable and thus cannot really be used
to explain price level movements.
7 Some studies have shown both categories to
hold equivalent time-series properties though.
See Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995).
8 Tentative evidence for India supports this
hypothesis. Portfolio flows are more volatile
than FDI, as measured by the standard deviation
of the two series.
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